Securing Communication Networks by leveraging Hardware-intrinsic security primitives
Julian Dreyer · osnaDocs (Osnabrück University) · 2024
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osnaDocs (Osnabrück University) · Osnabrück University · dissertation · 2024
Abstract
Creating trust in the digital world that is at least comparable to personal trust between humans is a significant challenge. Physical properties of the devices we use on a daily basis can be the starting point for the creation of such digital trust since these properties are only known by the devices themselves. Such properties and their behaviors are called Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and have first been conceptually described back in 1988 by Kirk Jordan at IBM. Since then, research focussed on finding and improving new ways of exploiting various types of integrated circuits that can be used for the creation of a PUF.
However, the real-world application of these implicit security improvements lags behind due to low numbers of evaluations and real-world implementation scenarios. With all of these theoretical concepts at hand, this thesis will, therefore, present such a scenario that can specifically benefit from leveraging the intrinsic hardware properties of the involved devices. In particular, the research presented in this thesis targets the trust and security on the Medium Access Control (MAC) layer in traditional local Ethernet networks due to their low security level in general.
To start with, we will first discuss the concept of authentic public key exchange to guarantee an authentic execution of the involved cryptographic routines. This involves a concept called NFC-Key Exchange (NFC-KE), which creates an Air of Trust (AoT) around the involved devices. Along the way, secure random numbers are needed to properly generate cryptographic material. For this, we will derive an entire True Random Number Generator (TRNG), based on a random PUF (rPUF), that warrants the fundamental security of the involved keys.
To bridge the gap between the well-researched PUF concepts and the real-world implementations, we will derive clear requirements for microcontrollers to be capable of generating Static Random Access Memory (SRAM)-based PUFs on the internal SRAM of the device. This concept is implemented and evaluated on the widely used ESP32 microcontroller and also extended for arbitrary microcontroller adaptability. By putting these concepts together we will finally be capable of securing networks against the infamous MAC address spoofing attacks that are used by attackers to impersonate other devices on the local network.
The SRAM PUF is used to generate unique MAC addresses that cannot be spoofed anymore, thus creating an implicit trust among the connected devices. For this, additional network packets are crafted using the security concepts around TRNGs and the NFC-KE. Moreover, the proposed concept also allows for a distinct randomization of the PUF-derived MAC address which has previously been paradoxical to the concept of device identification. With our concept at hand, developers, researchers, and Internet of Things (IoT) customers will experience new ways of implementing well-researched security primitives in their devices.
This can result in new use cases for physical hardware security, especially in the broad IoT domain.
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