Teste pensanti. Identità personale, animali umani e ‘persone residuali’
Alfredo Tomasetta · Rivista Italiana di Filosofia del Linguaggio · 2019
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Rivista Italiana di Filosofia del Linguaggio · University of Calabria · article · 2019
Abstract
Animalism is the view in personal ontology according to which we are identical with human animals. This paper focuses on a major objection to animalism put forward by Mark Johnston: the remnant-person problem. Your head detached from the rest of your body seems to be a person; now, if s/he is not you, then one can bring a person into being simply by removing tissue from something, and this is absurd. If, on the other hand, s/he is you, then animalism is false. I claim that one can offer a solution to this puzzle by denying the assumption that a detached head is a person, and I want to show that this can be done without assuming very controversial philosophical theses.
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