Juicio no-racionalizado dentro del pensamiento racional/ Non-rationalized judgement within rational thinking
María Dolores García-Arnaldos · PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) · 2018
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PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) · OpenAlex · article · 2018
Abstract
In this article, we consider Wittgenstein’s approach to non-inferential knowledge, its relation to special propositions, and the nature of the justification of these propositions. According to Wittgenstein, there is a kind of non-inferential knowledge whose rational status is not the result of basic beliefs (in a foundational sense) that justify it. In Wittgenstein’s rule-following analysis, Frege’s theory is criticized. This theory is based on the idea that having a conceptual repertoire prior to the understanding of any rule, requires having grasped the conditions of verification of a rule, which is a source of problems.
Following Wright’s construing of Wittgenstein’s ideas, we maintain that understanding concepts cannot be prior to the linguistic ability. RIFL (2018) Vol. 12, n. 2: 70-82. DOI: 10.4396/20180204.
Open the resolved locator · 10.4396/505
Metadata licence: OpenAlex metadata (CC0)