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What is the locus of abilities

Felipe Morales Carbonell · Rivista Italiana di Filosofia del Linguaggio · 2018

  • DOI 10.4396/501
  • Publisher University of Calabria
  • Type article
  • Issued 2018

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Rivista Italiana di Filosofia del Linguaggio · University of Calabria · article · 2018

Abstract

Loughlin’s (2018) uses Wittgenstein’s remarks in Philsophical Investigations to motivate his ‘wide’ view of cognition. In opposition to other accounts of extended cognition, his view presents a negative solution to the location problem. Here, I argue that, if we consider Wittgenstein’s remarks on the notion of ability, the support for the wide view is not as straightforward. The criteria for using the concept of ability are highly context-dependent, and there is not a single account for them. This shows that at best, a moderate form of anti-individualism for cognitive capacities can be defended on Wittgensteinian grounds.

Furthermore, the suggestion that ontological questions can be bypassed is questioned.

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