Normative accounts of assertion: from Peirce to Williamson, and back again
Neri Marsili · Archivio istituzionale della ricerca (Alma Mater Studiorum Università di Bologna) · 2015
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Archivio istituzionale della ricerca (Alma Mater Studiorum Università di Bologna) · Istituto di Ematologia di Bologna · article · 2015
Abstract
Arguably, a theory of assertion should be able to provide (i) a definition of assertion, and (ii) a set of conditions for an assertion to be appropriate. This paper reviews two strands of theories that have attempted to meet this challenge. Commitment-based accounts à la Peirce define assertion in terms of commitment to the truth of the proposition. Restriction-based accounts à la Williamson define assertion in terms of the conditions for its appropriate performance.
After assessing the suitability of these projects to meet the desiderata of a theory of assertion, I argue that a speech act theoretic account à la Searle is more suitable for this purpose: it integrates the core intuitions of both restriction-based and commitment-based accounts while avoiding their respective problems, and has the further advantage of determining how assertion fits into a more general theory of illocutionary acts.
Open the resolved locator · 10.4396/322
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