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Collective Benefits, Exchange Interests, and Norm Enforcement

Christine Horne · Social Forces · 2004

  • DOI 10.1353/sof.2004.0041
  • Publisher Oxford University Press
  • Type article
  • Issued 2004

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Social Forces · Oxford University Press · article · 2004

Abstract

Under what conditions are norms likely to be enforced? What processes lead to the punishment of deviant behavior? While social relations are thought to be a key part of the answer, their role is not well understood. In this article I develop one approach to explaining how exchange interests contribute to norm production. I argue that when the benefits resulting from enforcement enhance the ability of individuals to engage in profitable exchange, metanorms and norms are more likely to be enforced. Predictions are tested using experimental methods and are confirmed.

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